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Abstract
We consider a non-transferable utility game derived from a strategic form game with asymmetric information
where each player’s information is provided by communication system and define the solution concept of α-core
in the game. Our main purpose is to relax the axiom of wisdom and to prove the nestedness of communication
system ensure the nonemptiness of the solution concept even if players’ information is non-partitional.
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1 Introduction
This paper is in the stream of the researches on the core of games with asymmetric information.
We define a strategic form game with asymmetric information where players’ information are given
by communication system. We consider that the communication system can give the players non-
partitional information structure1. We derive the non-transferable utility game (NTU-game) from the
strategic form game above and define the solution concept, ex-ante α-core with communication system
1Most of the literature assume that each player’s information is a partition on the state space
1
? ??? ?
based on the idea of core. Our main purpose is to examine the nonemptiness of the core in relation to
the property of communication system.
In the literature, Scarf (1971) defines the core of the NTU-game which is derived from the strategic
form game under symmetric information. Scarf (1971) proves that the balancedness of the game is
a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core in the general settings. Wilson (1978) defines
two types of the core concepts under asymmetric information according to the players’ information
exchange patterns. The coarse core is based on the idea the players in a coalition can use only the
common information among them, while the fine core is based on the idea they can make use of the
members’ information fully. The nonemptiness of the coarse core is shown in the general settings.
Note that Wilson (1978) deals with interim decision making in contrast that this paper considers ex-
ante decision making. Yannelis (1991) considers the case where each player uses his or her private
information independent of the coalition he or she belongs to. Yannelis (1991) defines the core concept
of the game which is called the private core and examines the nonemptiness of the private core.
Maus (2003) introduces the communication system with which we can consider the players’ in-
formation exchange more flexibly. It exogenously defines each player’s information dependent on the
coalition he or she belongs to. Maus (2003) derives the NTU-game from an exchange economy and
shows that the core concept is nonempty if the communication system is nested2. Hirase and Utsumi
(2005) extend the seminal work by Maus (2003). They derive the NTU-game from a strategic form
game3 with communication system and show that the core concept is nonempty if the communication
system satisfies the nestedness.
All the literature above assume that each player’s information is a partition on the state space. In
this paper, we would like to relax the axiom of wisdom, which means that players’ information can be
non-partitional. Our main purpose is to prove the nonemptiness of the core concept of the NTU-game
derived from a strategic form game even if the axiom of wisdom is relaxed. This idea comes from Samet
(1991) who extends the agreement theorem by Aumann (1976) with relaxing the axiom of wisdom.
The rest of this seminal paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the game, the properties
of the communication system, and the core concept. Section 3 discusses the players’ information
structure. Section 4 provides a sufficient condition for nonemptiness of the core concept. Section 5
gives the concluding remarks and the future problems.
2Nestedness of the communication system implies that each player has the more information in the larger
coalition.
3A strategic form game is an extention of an exchange economy, since a game can consider the externality.
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2 The Game
The basic definition of the game is based on Hirase and Utsumi (2005). The difference is that we
allow the case in which the communication system gives the non-partitional information. This section
is organized as follows. First, we define the strategic form game with communication system where
players can exchange their information. Second, we define the NTU-game derived from the strategic
form game with communication system. Third, we define the ex-ante α-core of the NTU-game above.
Now we start with the definition of the strategic form game with communication system.
Definition 1. A strategic form game with directed link communication system Γ is a following list
of data (N,Ω, {Ai, ui}i∈N , {PSi }i∈N,S⊂N ).
• N = {1, ..., n} is the set of players.
• Ω = {ω1, ..., ωl} is the finite state space.
• Ai ⊂ ℜmi is the set of actions for player i. We assume Ai is a non-empty, convex, and compact
set.
• ui :
∏
i∈N (A
Ω
i )→ ℜ is player i’s payoff function. We assume ui is a continuous and quasi-concave
function on
∏
i∈N (A
Ω
i ).
• {PSi }i∈S,S⊂N , which we call the communication system, determines each player’s information
dependent on a coalition he or she belongs to. We assume PSi is a function Ω to 2Ω \ {∅} for all
S ⊂ N and i ∈ S.
AΩi is the set of functions from Ω to Ai. Σi denotes AΩi which we call the universal strategy set for
player i. PS,gi is the information of player i in S when the coalition S is formed.
Definition 2. We define the set of player i’s strategies for information PSi as follows.
ΣSi := {σSi ∈ Σi|σSi is PSi -measurable}.
This measurability condition is required because we can not consider each player can take different
actions at ω and ω′ if he or she do not distinct a state ω from another state ω′ with the information
PS,gi .
The set of the joint strategies of the coalition S is described as ΣS =
∏
i∈S Σ
S
i . σS denotes the
typical element of ΣS . For all R ⊂ N , a partition on R is interpreted as a coalition structure of R .
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P (R) denotes the set of all coalition structure of R. That means, for R ⊂ N , P (R) is defined by
P (R) :=
{
{S1, ..., SL}
�����
L∪
l=1
Sl = R and Sl ∩ Sm = ∅, for all l,m ∈ {1, ..., L} s.t. l ̸= m
}
.
Using these notations and these definitions, we can derive an NTU-game from the strategic form
game with communication system Γ as follows.
Definition 3. We define the NTU characteristic function V derived from the strategic form game
with communication system Γ as follows4.
V (S) :=
∪
σS∈ΣS
∩
Q∈P (N\S)
∩
(σT )T∈Q
∈(ΣT )T∈Q
{
(u1, ..., un) ∈ ℜn
��� ∀i ∈ S, ui ≤ ui(σS , (σT )T∈Q)
}
for all S ∈ N.
V (S) means the set of payoff profiles, which the players in a coalition S can gain at least, even if the
worst situation (coalition structure and strategies of N \ S) for S occurs. This α-concept is suggested
by Aumann and Peleg (1960).
Before the definition of the core concept of the NTU-game, we define the improvement concept.
Definition 4. We say that a coalition S improves upon the payoff vector u in ℜn if u is in intV (S).
The definition of the improvement concept implies that all members in the coalition S have the
incentive to deviate from the situation where the players gain the payoff profiles u. All members of
S can be better off by the deviation. We can not say u is stable in this sense, and u can not be a
candidate for a solution concept. We define the solution concept of the NTU-game which is robust for
such a deviation.
Definition 5. For an NTU characteristic function V , we define the ex-ante α-core with communi-
cation system C(V ) as
C(V ) := V (N) \
∪
T⊂N
intV (T ).
The ex-ante α-core with communication system is the set of the payoff profiles that is achieved by
the grand coalition and is not improved upon by any coalition of the players. Without confusion, we
4The definition is same as Hirase and Utsumi (2005).
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use the word just “core” to refer to the ex-ante α-core with communication system.
3 The Information Structure
In this section, we discuss the players’ information structure in detail. In the literature introduced
in Section 1, each player’s information is assumed to be a partition on Ω and we would like to relax it.
For this purpose, we consider 3 properties of the players information as follows. Note that we omit the
index of the players and coalitions, PSi is simply denoted by P.
• P-1 : ω ∈ P(ω) for all ω in Ω.
• P-2 : ω′ ∈ P(ω) implies P(ω′) ⊂ P(ω) for all ω in Ω.
• P-3 : ω′ ∈ P(ω) implies P(ω′) ⊃ P(ω) for all ω in Ω.
P-1 is the property that each player never excludes the real state. When the real state is ω, the
player thinks that ω may have occurred.
To clarify the meaning of P-2, we consider its contraposition: If there is a state z such that z /∈ P(ω)
and z ∈ P(ω′), then ω′ /∈ P(ω). This can be interpreted as follows. If a player at ω knows that the
state z is impossible and that if the real state is ω′, then z is probable, then he or she infers that ω′ is
not the real state.
To clarify the meaning of P-3, consider its contraposition again: If there is a state z such that
z ∈ P(ω) and z /∈ P(ω′), then ω′ /∈ P(ω). This means that if a player at ω knows that the state z
is probable and that if the real state is ω′, then z is impossible, then he or she infers that ω′ is not
the real state. P-3 is called axiom of wisdom. We consider the situation where P-3 is not necessarily
satisfied.
Note that the following remark holds.
Remark 1. If P-1 and P-3 are satisfied, then P-2 is also satisfied.
Proof. Suppose ω′ ∈ P(ω). Then P-3 implies P(ω′) ⊃ P(ω). Since ω ∈ P(ω) by P-1, we have
ω ∈ P(ω′). Then exchanging the role of ω and ω′ in P-3, we can conclude P(ω′) ⊂ P(ω).
We discuss the relation between these properties and the partitional information structure. We say
P is partitional if there is a partition on Ω such that for any ω ∈ Ω the set P(ω) is equal to the element
of the partition that contains ω.
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As in Rubinstein (1998), the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1.
P is partitional if and only if P satisfies P-1, P-2, and P-3.
Proof. If P is partitional, P obviously satisfies P-1, P-2, and P-3.
On the other hand, suppose that P satisfies P-1, P-2, and P-3. If P(ω) and P(ω′) intersect and
z ∈ P(ω) ∩ P(ω′) then by P-2 and P-3, we obtain P(ω) = P(ω′) = P(z). From P-1, we obtain
∪
ω∈Ω P(ω) = Ω. Thus, P is partitional.
This proposition implies that most of the literature assume players’ information satisfies P-1, P-2,
and P-35. However, if the rationality of the players is more bounded, all the property of the information
is not necessarily satisfied. Some partitional information structure and non-partitional information
structure are displayed in the following examples
Example 1.
Suppose P is as follows.
P(ω1) = P(ω2) = {ω1, ω2}, P(ω3) = P(ω4) = {ω3, ω4}, and P(ω5) = P(ω6) = {ω5, ω6}.
We can check that P-1, P-2, and P-3 are satisfied, hence this information is partitional and described
as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Partitional Information Structure
♢
Example 2.
Suppose P′ is as follows.
P′(ω1) = P′(ω2) = {ω1, ω2}, P′(ω3) = P′(ω4) = {ω1, ω3, ω3, ω4}, and P′(ω5) = P′(ω6) = {ω5, ω6}.
We can find that P-1 and P-2 are satisfied and P-3 is not satisfied (ω1 ∈ P′(ω3) but P′(ω1) ̸⊃ P′(ω3)).
Hence this information is non-partitional and described as in Figure 2.
5Note that, in the literature of modal logic, the model where each players information structure satisfies P-1,
P-2, and P-3 is called S-5.
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Figure 2: Non-Partitional Information Structure
♢
Rubinstein (1998) shows the example where the information structure is not partitional.
Example 3. (Rubinstein; 1998)
One gets the good/badl results of an examination. He or she forgets bad news and remembers
good news. Denoting good news as G and bad news as B, Ω = {G,B}, P(G) = {G}, P(B) = {G,B}.
This information satisfies P-1 and P-2. However, it does not satisfy P-3. G ∈ P(B), B ∈ P(B) but
B ̸∈ P(G). At B, the player does not conclude that the state is B from the absence of knowledge of
the good news.
This situation can be described as in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Non-Partitional Information Structure
♢
Example 4.
Suppose P′′ is as follows.
P′′(ω1) = P′′(ω2) = {ω1, ω2}, P′′(ω3) = P′′(ω4) = {ω3, ω4}, and P′′(ω5) = P′′(ω6) = {ω4, ω5, ω6}
We can check that P-2 is not satisfied either (ω4 ∈ P(ω5) but P(ω4) ̸⊂ P(ω5)). This information is
not partitional and described as in Figure 4.
We discuss relaxing the axioms and nonemptiness of the core in the next section.
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Figure 4: Non-Partitional Information Structure
♢
4 The Nonemptiness of the Core
We analyze the relation between the property of the communication system and the nonemptiness
of the core in this section.
We provide the definition of the nestedness of the communication system.6
Definition 6.
A communication system {PSi }i∈S,S⊂N is nested if for all S and T ⊂ N such that S ⊂ T ,
PSi (ω) ⊃ PTi (ω) for all i ∈ S and ω ∈ Ω.
The nestedness implies that each player in the larger coalition has the richer information. Hirase
and Utsumi (2005) show the nestedness of the communication system ensures the nonemptiness of the
core when each player’s information structure is partitional. Combining this fact and the remark in
the previous section, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
The α-core with communication system of V is non-empty if the communication system is nested
and satisfies P-1 and P-3.
We can also say the nonemptiness of the core is ensured even if the property P-3 is not satisfied.
That means, the following proposition holds. Note that, in the literature of modal logic, the model
where each players information structure satisfies P-1 and P-2 is called S-4.
Proposition 3.
The α-core with communication system of V is non-empty if the communication system is nested
6The definition of the nestedness is same as Maus (2003)
8
? ??? ?
Ex-ante ?-core with communication system in an S-? logic model
and satisfies P-1 and P-2.7
This means that the core can be nonempty even if players’ information is described as in Example
2 and 3. Therefore, we can obtain the nonemptiness of the core even if the players information is not
partitional. However note that Example 4 is not the case because its information does not satisfy P-2.
5 Concluding Remarks
We can interpret our main result as the extensions of some seminal works in the literature. Our
model is an asymmetric information version of Scarf (1971) and our framework allows non-partitional
information structure which is not considered by Hirase and Utsumi (2005).
We can consider the following points as future problems.
At first, we would like to extend the results of Hirase (2009 and 2015). Hirase (2009) examines
the partial cooperation situation by using the network8. The model deals with the game where players
can cooperate and exchange information only through the network which is called network commu-
nication system and given exogenously. It is proved that the core concept is nonempty if network
communication system is nested. Hirase (2015) focuses on the properties of the links of the network
communication system and examines the nonemptiness of the core concept. Both papers assume the
partitional information structure and we would like to relax it.
Second, we would like to describe how the directed links are formed, that is, to consider the model
in which the structure of the links is endogenously determined. Considering asymmetric information
versions of the models by Hirase (2012 and 2013), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Watts (2001) can
be the case.
Third, information exchange with our communication system does not necessarily satisfy incentive
compatible constraints of the players. We would like to define and examine incentive compatible
solution concept. Applying the ideas by Forges and Minelli (2001) and Yazar (2001) to our model can
be the case.
At last, we would like to consider more bounded rationality of the players, which means to relax
the axiom(s) on players’ information more. If it is possible, it is an extension of this seminal work.
7The outline of the proof is same as Hirase and Utsumi (2005).
8The idea is based on Myerson (1977).
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